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Abstract:  
 
Purpose: The main objective of this study is to examine whether the dividend policy of 
Indonesian firms is based on agency theory or stewardship theory. The study investigates the 
relationship between profitability, non-discretionary accruals, discretionary accruals and 
dividend policy. 
Design/Methodology/Approach: The final sample of this study is a total of 28 firms of 
consumers‘ goods industries listed in Indonesia Stock Exchange during the period of 2010 to 
2017 and conducts logistic regression for hypotheses testing.  
Findings: The result of the first model shows that ROA and non-discretionary accruals (non-
disc) have positive sign and they are significant on dividend policy.  The second model shows 
that ROA has a positive and significant effect on dividend policy, while non-disc is 
insignificant on dividend policy. The third model shows that ROA and non-disc are 
consistently positive and significant, while discretionary accruals are consistently 
insignificant on dividend policy. The fourth model shows that ROA and non-disc have 
positive sign and significant on dividend policy, while disc is insignificant on dividend 
policy. The fifth model shows that ROA and non-disc have a positive and significant sign on 
dividend policy, while DAR, AG and disc are insignificant on dividend policy.   The results of 
profitability on all models also indicate that the objective of managers for most Indonesian 
dividend payers are align with the objective of stockholders in context of stewardship. The 
findings imply that most of firms as payers tend to increase dividends when their profitability 
increases.   
Practical Implications: It appears that dividend payers with strong profitability as based on 
their policy, generally do not engage in managing its earnings while reporting the 
accounting information. 
Originality/Value: The study provides empirical evidence for dividend policy in context of 
agency and stewardship perspectives. This study also identifies the behavior of firm insiders 
whether play as an agent or steward in relationship with their principals. 
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The study starts from the general assumption that managers manage the firms in 
terms to create earnings for stockholders. The earnings themself ideally should be 
allocated for any additional investments, dividends, or both. Formally, the earnings 
are a result of accounting information and managers have the control to take policies 
in recording the transactions based on normal or abnormal accruals. More specific, 
the implications of manager’s policies on stockholders by controlling accounting 
information are increase or decrease the dividends. Under this assumption, this study 
sets the issue on relationship between principals and agent in context of dividend 
policy to examine whether managers play a role as agent or steward in determining 
dividends for principals or stockholders.  
 
There are two kinds of managers who play the role behind dividend policy. First is a 
perfect agent which plays as steward, and second is an imperfect agent which plays 
as agent on his/her own interest (Easterbrook, 1984). Some articles such as 
Easterbrook (1984), DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1990), Crutchley et al. (1999), La 
Porta et al. (2000), Myers (2001), Chetty and Saez (2010), and Kuan et al. (2012) 
suggest that the basic problem in dividend policy is mostly determined by agency 
conflict. This conflict arise when managers tend to consume the free cash for their 
own benefit through their own discretionary rather than to increase the firm value or 
to maximize the wealth of stockholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Jensen, 1986; 
Jensen, 1988; Aivazian et al., 2005).  
 
The findings of Jensen and Meckling (1976), and Jensen (1986) on manager 
opportunistic behavior implies that managers tend to apply abnormal accruals or 
earnings management specifically on dividend policy. But, the explanation about 
dividend policy is not only in a point of view of agency conflict. Although articles 
are very rare, but such studies as of Donaldson and Davis (1991), Davis et al. 
(1997), Dewenter and Warther (1998), Daniel et al. (2008) prove that managers tend 
to run the firms at good governance and serve the stockholders in a way to maximize 
their wealth. Donaldson and Davis (1991) refer this un-opportunistic behavior of 
managers as stewardship theory.  
 
The objective of this study provides empirical evidence on the topic of dividend 
policy in context of stewardship theory and agency problem for the case of 
Indonesian firms especially the firms in the consumers‘ goods industry sector as this 
sector has significant index in Indonesian capital market. This study finds that return 
on assets and non-discretionary accruals (normal accruals) have positive and 
significant effect on dividend policy. This study also finds that debt, assets growth, 
and discretionary accruals (abnormal accruals) are insignificant to affect dividend 
policy of Indonesian dividend payers. On these findings, this study implies that 
dividend policy of Indonesian firms as dividend payers are most determined by 
profitability. Moreover, the most important implication is the fact that Indonesian 
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dividend payers have tendency not practicing earnings management on determining 
dividend policy while the insiders behave as steward.   
 
2. Literature Review 
 
 2.1 Dividend Policy and Stewardship Theory 
 
Many studies such as Yi et al. (2007), Hanlon and Hoopes (2014), Ozuomba et al. 
(2016), Farrukh et al. (2017) show that dividend is the main point to increase the 
wealth of stockholders of public firms. In the objective to increase the wealth of 
stockholders the firm insiders should increase the firm performance specifically for 
profitability to meet the optimum dividend policy (Arosa et al., 2010). The findings 
of Fama and French (2001), Grullon et al. (2002), DeAngelo et al. (2006), Denis and 
Osobov (2008), Li and Zhao (2008), Fairchild et al. (2014), Mahdzan et al. (2016), 
and Kumar and Sujit (2018) show that most of profitable firms normally distribute 
more dividends to their stockholders. Those findings imply that ideally more 
profitable firms should pay higher dividends to increase the wealth of their 
stockholders. The pioneer works of Donaldson and Davis (1991) and Davis et al. 
(1997) about stewardship theory suggest that if the managers act not under 
opportunistic behavior and trustworthy then the desire of stockholders as principals 
can be fulfilled. The stewardship theory of Donaldson and Davis (1991) and Davis 
et al. (1997) gives implication that managers as insiders tend to apply better 
management including the use of normal accruals in their objective to distribute 
optimum dividends to stockholders.  
 
There are some studies which provide evidence closely supporting the stewardship 
theory. The study of Dewenter and Warther (1998) on 420 U.S and 194 Japanese 
firms during the period of 1982 until 1993 provides evidence that the agency conflict 
in most of Japanese firms especially for keiretsu-member firms has insignificant 
effect on their dividend policy. While for the U.S firms, the finding of Dewenter and 
Warther (1998) show that dividend policy normally used as a disciplinary 
mechanism on their managers as agents. Similarly, Kato et al. (2002) found that 
Japanese firms tend to support the cash flow information hypothesis which implies 
that these firms do not use dividend policy to solve the agency conflict especially in 
case of overinvestment problem. Lara et al. (2005) convince that managers who 
keep earnings conservatism usually record non-discretionary accruals to keep 
accounting information reliable. Additionally, Lara et al. (2005) convince that 
managers who record discretionary accruals normally avoid the conservatism 
principle. The evidence of Daniel et al. (2008) shows that firms which normally pay 
dividends tend to manage their earnings upward to keep the dividend threshold for 
stockholders. The recent study of He et al. (2017) show the evidence that firms as 
dividend payers have a tendency for less earnings‘ manipulation and use dividend to 
mitigate the agency conflict. Chansarn and Chansarn (2016) provide evidence that 
discretionary accruals or earnings management has negative relationship with 
dividend policy. This study assumes that if the definition of manager’s discretion on 





free cash by Jensen (1986) can be measured with abnormal accruals or discretionary 
accruals by the model of Jones (1991) and the rest is normal accruals or non-
discretionary accruals then under the assumption of stewardship theory where 
managers works in-line with the objectives of stockholders, this study posit:  
 
H1 : Higher profitability gives higher dividend. 
H2 : Higher non-discretionary accruals gives higher dividend. 
H3 : Higher discretionary accruals gives lower dividend. 
 
 2.2 Control Variables 
 
To confirm the existence of agency conflict, this study uses debt as control variable. 
Thakor and Wilson (1995), Neale et al. (1998), Aivazian et al. (2005), and Brav et 
al. (2005) confirm that firms which obtain more debt for financing shall control the 
spending behaviors of managers. In addition, the studies of Easterbrook (1984), 
Jensen (1986), and Brav et al. (2005) suggest that stockholders should ask more 
dividends while firms obtain more debt for financing. But, Fairchild et al. (2014) 
confirm that the consequence of higher debt shall decrease distribution of dividends. 
Sunder and Myers (1999), Grullon et al. (2002), and Strebulaev and Yang (2013) 
suggest that to distribute more dividends then firms should decrease their usage of 
debt. 
 
The other control variable on dividend policy of this study is assets‘ growth. Jensen 
(1988) assumes that the moral hazard of managers is coming up in conditions where 
firms have large free cash which is available to expand in more profitable 
investments. Fairchild et al. (2014) suggest that to mitigate the internal conflict then 
dividend increases normally have negative relationship with growth opportunities. 
Fama and French (2001) confirm that firms with more investment opportunities are 
less likely to pay dividend. The recent studies of Chemmanur et al. (2010), and 
Yahya and Ghazali (2017) provide evidence that firms with more growth 
opportunities have the tendency to cut dividends. Therefore other hypotheses are: 
 
H4 : The higher debt gives higher dividend. 
H5 : Higher assets growth gives lower dividend. 
 
3. Research Methodology 
 
 3.1 Sample 
 
This study takes the data from Indonesia Stock Exchange (www.idx.co.id) for the 
period of 2010 until 2017. The final sample of this study consists of 28 listed firms 
from the consumers‘ goods industry. The study excludes the firms with dis-list 
status, new listing status, and not publicly published the audit report. This study 
conducts logistic regression with basic model as follow: 
 
N.S. Budiarso  
 
87  
DIV = α + βROA + βDAR + βAG + βN.Disc + βDisc + ε              (1) 
 
 3.2 Definition of Variables 
 
Dependent variable of this study is the dividend policy, where dividend payers is 1 
and 0 the opposite. To be included as dividend payers firms should pay dividend 
more than 0 (in average) along the observed period. The independent variables are 
the return on assets (ROA) as the ratio of net income over total assets, the debt ratio 
(DAR) as the ratio of total debt over total assets and the assets‘ growth (AG) as the 
growth in total assets. The study uses the model of Jones (1991) to measure 
variables of non-discretionary accruals (NDisc) and discretionary accruals (Disc) 
with the following procedures. First, the study calculates the total accruals (TAit) 
with the model in equation 2: 
 
TAt = (ΔCAt - ΔCasht) - (ΔCLt - Dep&Amort.Expt)              (2) 
 
TAit is total accruals in year t for firm i and this study excludes tax payables and part 
of long-term debt from current liabilities to calculate total accruals as suggested by 
Jones (1991); ΔCA is the difference of current assets in year t and year t-1; ΔCash is 
the difference of cash in year t and year t-1; ΔCL is the difference of current 
liabilities in year t and year t-1; and Dep&Amort.Expt is the depreciation plus 
amortization expenses for year t. Second, the study estimates the normal and 
abnormal of earnings management with the model in equation 3: 
 
TAit/Ait-1 = αi(1/Ait-1) + βi(ΔREVit/Ait-1) + βi(ΔPPEit/Ait-1) + εit                      (3) 
 
TAit is total accruals in year t for firm i; ΔREVit is the revenue difference of year t 
and year t-1; PPEit is the difference of acquisition cost of property, plant, and 
equipment of year t and year t-1; Ait-1 is the total assets in year t-1 for firm i; and εit 
is the residual error. This study uses εit as abnormal accruals or discretionary 
accruals (Disc) and measures it by standardized residuals error estimate of 
regression of each firm while normal accruals or non-discretionary accruals (N.Disc) 
is the sum of αi(1/Ait-1) + βi(ΔREVit/Ait-1) + βi(ΔPPEit/Ait-1) of each firm. 
 
4. Results and Discussion 
 
 4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 1 reports that the difference of ROA between payers and non-payers are 
significant where payers have higher ROA. This result means that firms as dividend 
payers have better profitability than firms as non-dividend payers. Although the 
results of other variables such as DAR, AG, N.Disc, and Disc show insignificant 
differences but the results show that firms as dividend payers have more growth 
opportunities, less debt, and higher non-discretionary accruals. Table 1 also reports 
that the mean of Disc for both payers and non-payers have zero value and 





insignificant difference which means that these firms have less abnormal accruals or 
earnings management.  
 




Min Max Mean Min Max Mean 
ROA -0.21 0.67 0.14 -0.04 0.21 0.05 0.09*** 
DAR 0.09 1.97 0.41 0.23 0.69 0.45 -0.04 
AG -0.76 5.07 0.17 -0.07 0.82 0.13 0.04 
N.Disc -2.74 1.48 -0.17 -2.40 0.91 -0.33 0.16 
Disc -1.73 1.63 0.00 -1.20 1.36 0.00 0.00 
Notes: This table reports descriptive statistics between payers and non-payers. Return on 
assets (ROA) is ratio of net income over total assets; debt ratio (DAR) is ratio of total debt 
over total assets; assets growth (AG) is growth in total assets; discretionary accruals 
(Disc) is standardized residuals error estimate of regression; and non-discretionary 
accruals (N.Disc) is sum of αi(1/Ait-1) + βi(ΔREVit/Ait-1) + βi(ΔPPEit/Ait-1). ***, **, and * 
indicate statistical significance at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10, respectively. 
 
 4.2 Discussion 
 
Model 1:  
Table 2 shows that ROA has a positive significant sign on dividend policy. On this 
result, this study accepts H1. The findings are consistent with the findings of Fama 
and French (2001), Grullon et al. (2002), DeAngelo et al. (2006), Denis and Osobov 
(2008), Li and Zhao (2008), Fairchild et al. (2014), Mahdzan et al. (2016), and 
Kumar and Sujit (2018). The findings imply that most of firms as payers tend to 
increase dividend when their profitability increases. The results of profitability on all 
models also indicate that the objective of managers of most of Indonesian dividend 
payers are align with the objective of stockholders in context of stewardship as 
suggested by Donaldson and Davis (1991) and Davis et al. (1997). This study also 
accepts H2 since Table 2 also shows that non-discretionary (N.Disc) has positive 
significant sign on dividend policy. Notice the work of Lara et al. (2005), Dewenter 
and Warther (1998), Kato et al. (2002), Daniel et al. (2008) and He et al. (2017) 
then this study convinces that N.Disc somehow relates to managers behavior to 
record transactions according to legal standard of accounting, thus, it has tendency 
for less earnings manipulation. The result of N.Disc on this model also confirm the 
result of ROA which indicates that most of the managers of Indonesian dividend 
payers tend to behave as steward to their principal stockholders. 
 
Model 2:  
Table 2 shows that the result of ROA is positive and significant on dividend policy. 
The result of Disc shows that discretionary accruals is insignificant on dividend 
policy which makes this study rejecting H3. Although the negative sign of Disc is 
consistent with earnings management literatures such as Chansarn and Chansarn 
(2016), the result implies that earnings management does not affect dividend policy 
in the context of Indonesian firms. Similar to Model 1, this study assumes that 
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managers do not play their role as agents which implies agency conflict is not a base 
for dividend policy in the context of Indonesian firms. Table 2 also shows that the 
pseudo R-square has dropped from 0.193 to 0.174 after Dics variable entered the 
Model. 
 




1 2 3 4 5 
Intercept 0.592 0.492 0.592 0.421 0.419 
ROA 9.924*** 9.669*** 9.930*** 10.291*** 10.049*** 
DAR    0.353 0.146 
AG     0.978 
N.Disc 0.463*  0.463* 0.474* 0.625** 
Disc  -0.023 -0.023 -0.028 -0.019 
Chi-square 202.970 206.077 202.961 202.861 200.824 
Pseudo R-Square 0.193 0.174 0.193 0.193 0.206 
Notes: This table reports the logistic regression of dividend policy. Dependent variable is 
dividend policy, where dividend payers is 1 and 0 for vise versa. The reference category is 
firms as non-payers. Return on assets (ROA) is ratio of net income over total assets; debt 
ratio (DAR) is ratio of total debt over total assets; assets growth (AG) is growth in total 
assets; discretionary accruals (Disc) is standardized residuals error estimate of regression; 
and non-discretionary accruals (N.Disc) is sum of αi(1/Ait-1) + βi(ΔREVit/Ait-1) + 
βi(ΔPPEit/Ait-1). ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10, 
respectively. 
 
Model 3:  
Table 2 shows that the signs of ROA and N.Disc are consistently positive and 
significant, while Disc is consistently insignificant on dividend policy. These results 
confirm the results from Model 1 and 2 which indicate that dividend payment is 
determined by profitability under the condition that managers act in-line with the 
objectives of their stockholders. Moreover, the pseudo R-square is better than in 
Model 2 after N.Disc and Disc enter together with profitability. 
 
Model 4:  
Table 2 confirms that the presence of DAR does not change the result for ROA and 
N.Disc. Both of these variables consistently have positive sign and are significant on 
dividend policy. The result of analysis also confirms that Disc is also consistently 
insignificant on dividend policy. Furthermore, the result also shows that DAR has an 
insignificant effect on dividend policy in case of agency conflict as suggested by 
Easterbrook (1984), Jensen (1986) and Brav et al. (2005) although the sign of DAR 
seems to support the possibility of agency conflict. On this result, the study rejects 
H4. Although the result of DAR shows insignificant effect, but its result provide 
small evidence that Indonesian firms as dividend payers will not decrease their 
dividend payment as they obtain more debts into capital structure. On this result, the 
finding for DAR of this study is inconsistent with the works of Sunder and Myers 
(1999), Grullon et al. (2002), Strebulaev and Yang (2013), and Fairchild et al. 





(2014) who suggest taht in order to decrease debt capacity is required to increase 
dividend payment. Table 2 also shows that the presence of DAR into the Model does 
not change the pseudo R-square since its value (0.193) is consistent with Model 3. 
 
Model 5: 
Table 2 shows that the signs of ROA, DAR, N.Disc, and Disc are constant after AG 
enter into the model. The results also shows that N.Disc is getting significant on 
dividend policy which convinces that the management of Indonesian dividend 
payers is in-line with stewardship theory. Although the sign is positive, but the result 
of AG provides evidence that assets growth does not affects dividend policy 
significantly and this study rejects H5. This finding implies that additional profitable 
investment activities are not triggered by moral hazard of managers as suggested by 
Jensen (1988). Although the result of AG is insignificant, this study provide small 
evidence that to increase assets growth for Indonesian firms does not require 
dividend reduction as suggested by Fama and French (2001), Chemmanur et al. 
(2010), Fairchild et al. (2014) and Yahya and Ghazali (2017). Moreover, the pseudo 
R-square shows better value (0.206) rather than in the previous Models after the 
presence of AG. 
 
 4.3 Robustness Test 
 
Table 3 presents the robustness test where business risk (BR) is used in this study to 
test the Models. The study measures BR as the standard deviation of ROA. The 
results on all Models show that ROA and N.Disc have consistent signs and still 
significant on dividend policy after BR enters the Models as an additionaal 
independent variable. Based on these results, the study confirms that all models are 
robust and at once proves that profitability is a main determinant of dividend policy 
under circumstances that managers act as a perfect agent for their stockholders. 
 




1 2 3 4 5 
Intercept -0.818 -0.938 -0.818 -0.619 -0.545 
ROA 12.554*** 12.542*** 12.560*** 12.005*** 11.349*** 
DAR    -0.417 -0.666 
AG     0.832 
N.Disc 0.486*  0.486* 0.477* 0.534* 
Disc  -0.028 -0.028 -0.021 -0.008 
BR 33.458*** 33.746*** 33.465*** 33.716*** 32.721*** 
Chi-square 182.308 185.422 182.296 182.185 181.651 
Pseudo R-Square 0.312 0.295 0.312 0.313 0.316 
Notes: This table reports the logistic regression of dividend policy as robustness test. 
Dependent variable is dividend policy, where dividend payers is 1 and 0 for vise versa. The 
reference category is firms as non-payers. Return on assets (ROA) is ratio of net income 
over total assets; debt ratio (DAR) is ratio of total debt over total assets; assets growth 
(AG) is growth in total assets; discretionary accruals (Disc) is standardized residuals error 
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estimate of regression; non-discretionary accruals (N.Disc) is sum of αi(1/Ait-1) + 
βi(ΔREVit/Ait-1) + βi(ΔPPEit/Ait-1); and BR is business risk measured by standard deviation 
of return on assets. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10, 
respectively. 
 
5. Conclusion  
 
Earnings is a result of accounting information which ideally is used for additional 
investments, to distribute as dividend, or both. In the context of dividend policy, the 
power of insiders to control accounting information in determining the earnings of 
the firms in order to give an impact to increase or to decrease dividend distribution 
on stockholders. These possibilities will depend on insiders whether to play as agent 
or steward policy in relationship with stockholders as their principals.  
 
The study finds that return on assets and non-discretionary accruals (normal 
accruals) have positive and significant effect on dividend policy. These findings 
imply that profitability is the main determinant on dividend policy of Indonesian 
firms as dividend payers. Also, the findings imply that Indonesian dividend payers 
do not practice earnings management to determine dividend policy as the insiders do 
not have moral hazard to establish corporate management. 
 
The study limits the sample on listed firms in the consumers‘ goods industry sector 
as this sector has significant index in Indonesian capital market. As for the study 
limitations, we refer to the fact that is only for one sector with 28 firms during the 
period of 2010 to 2017 a total of 224 observations. Moreover, this study limits the 
method to detect earnings management based on Jones’s model and the perspectives 
in context of agency theory and stewardship theory to examine dividend policy 
specifically in the context of Indonesian firms. 
 
Because on the above limitations, the study suggests the followings:  
 
➢ further studies to extend the scope in the context of international markets or 
other markets of developing countries;  
➢ further studies in the context of Indonesian firms for other sectors;  
➢ further studies should extend the total observation data set;  
➢ further studies should expand the method in detecting earnings management 
besides the methodology of this study;  
➢ further studies should extend the perspectives besides agency theory and 
stewardship theory, such as catering theory and life-cycle theory;  
➢ further studies should add more variables to examine agency theory and 
stewardship theory;  
➢ since the robustness test of this study shows that business risk is significant 
then further studies need to test this variable on relevant theories or use other 
measurement of risks. 
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